Dual Class Shares around the Top Financial Centres by Huang, Flora
	 1	
Dual	Class	Shares	Around	the	Top	Global	Financial	Centres			Dr.	Flora	Huang	Essex	Law	School,	UK		E-mail:	flora.huang@essex.ac.uk		(This	working	paper	was	published	on	Journal	of	Business	Law	[2017],	vol.	2,	pp.137-154)			




I. Introduction		Dual	 class	 shares	 (DCS)	 which	 could	 be	 created	 either	 through	 initial	 public	offerings	(IPOs)	or	recapitalisations,	offer	different	classes	of	shares	that	confer	distinct	voting	and	control	rights	on	the	holder.	The	divergence	provides	insiders	with	 a	 majority	 of	 voting	 rights,	 despite	 their	 smaller	 residual	 claims.1	The	popularity	of	DCS	has	been	paralleled	with	a	 takeover	wave	since	1980	and	an	increasing	 number	 of	 technology	 companies	 entering	 the	 stock	market.2	Many	US	 companies	 like	 Google,	 Facebook,	 Groupon	 and	 LinkedIn,	 have	 favoured	 a	DCS	structure.	However,	not	everywhere	like	the	US	welcome	such	structure.3		DCS,	despite	having	long	existed,	are	back	to	spotlight	again	due	to	the	listing	of	Alibaba	on	the	New	York	Stock	Exchange	(NYSE),	the	largest	IPO	in	history.4	The	company	 chose	 the	NYSE	over	 the	Hong	Kong	 Stock	Exchange	 (HKEx)	 and	 the	London	Stock	Exchange	(LSE)	as	the	latter	two	prohibit	the	listing	of	companies	that	employ	 ‘differential	voting	structures’,	namely	DCS,	while	such	structure	is	permitted	 in	 the	US.	The	request	by	 the	company	 in	 its	 IPO	application	 for	 the	granting	of	an	exemption	from	the	one	share-one	vote	principle	has	brought	the	debate	 over	whether	 the	 bourses	 should	 relax	 their	 listing	 standards	 to	 allow	certain	listed	companies	to	adopt	DCS.			The	paper	aims	to	find	out	why	the	major	jurisdictions	particularly	those	leading	financial	 centres	have	different	views	on	DCS	and	how	divergent	 they	are.	The																																																									1	The	dual	class	structure	essentially	creates	a	concentration	of	control	that	differs	from	concentrated	ownership	in	general.	See	Walid	Ben-Amar	and	Paul	Andre,	‘Separation	of	Ownership	from	Control	and	Acquiring	Firm	Performance:	The	Case	of	Family	Ownership	in	Canada’	(2006)	33	Journal	of	Business	Finance	&	Accounting	517.	2	Gregg	Jarrell	and	Annette	Poulsen,	'Dual-Class	Recapitalisation	as	Antitakeover	Mechanisms'	(1988)	20	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	129;	and	Kristian	Rydqvist,	‘Dual-Class	Shares:	A	Review’	(1992)	8	Oxford	Review	of	Economic	Policy	45,	48.	3	HKEx,	‘Concept	Paper	Weighted	Voting	Rights’	(2014),	40,	at	<http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/Documents/cp2014082.pdf	>	accessed	26	July	2015.	Basically	speaking,	there	are	three	types	of	approaches	to	DCS	around	the	world.	The	first	category	is	jurisdictions	which	permit	such	regime	in	both	their	corporate	law	and	listing	rules	(e.g.	the	US,	Canada	and	Sweden).	The	second	category	is	to	allow	company	to	have	DCS	but	having	restrictions	on	listed	companies,	(e.g.	Hong	Kong,	UK	and	Australia).	The	third	one	is	that	both	corporate	law	and	listing	rules	prohibit	DCS	structure,	(e.g.	Germany,	Spain	and	Mainland	China).	4	On	19	September	2014,	Alibaba,	the	largest	Chinese	e-commerce	company,	completed	the	largest	IPO	on	the	NYSE,	raising	US$25	billion	and	surpassing	the	2010	offering	from	the	Agricultural	Bank	of	China.	See	Nicole	Bullock	et	al,	‘Alibaba	Closes	at	$93.89	in	NYSE	Debut’	(Financial	Times,	20	September	2014),	at		<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8150f416-4002-11e4-a381-00144feabdc0.html#slide0>	accessed	26	July	2015.		
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target	 is	on	the	top	5	global	 financial	centres,	namely	New	York,	London,	Hong	Kong,	 Singapore	 and	 Tokyo,5	partly	 because	 of	 their	 significance	 to	 the	 world	economy,	partly	because	of	 the	close	association	between	 financial	centres	and	stock	exchanges.6	The	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	After	introduction,	Section	II	 will	 discuss	 the	 controversies	 of	 DCS	 from	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	perspectives.	Section	III	will	 investigate	the	attitudes	of	the	five	global	financial	centres	 towards	 DCS	 respectively,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 recent	 reforms	 of	 their	company	 law	 and	 listing	 rules	 with	 respect	 to	 DCS.	 Section	 IV	 concludes	 by	discussing	the	implication	for	other	jurisdictions.			
II. Controversies	over	Dual	Class	Shares:	Theoretical	and	Evidential	
Analysis			Lawyers	and	economists	have	divided	opinions	on	DCS.	In	theory,	DCS	have	been	long	 criticised	 for	 violating	 the	 one	 share-one	 vote	 principle	 and	 destroying	shareholder	democracy.7	One	 share-one	vote	 is	 frequently	described	as	a	 ‘legal	consequence’	 of	 shareholder	 primacy,	 and	 a	 bedrock	 principle	 of	 corporate	governance.8	The	 rationale	 for	 one	 share-one	 vote	 is	 that	 shareholders,	 as	residual	 claimants,	 have	 the	 strongest	 interest	 in	 maximising	 firm	 value	 and	should	therefore	have	equal	voting	rights.9	In	contrast,	 the	disjunction	between																																																									5	Z/Yen	Group,	‘Global	Financial	Centres	Index	17’,	March	2015,	4,	at	<http://www.longfinance.net/images/GFCI17_23March2015.pdf>	accessed	26	July	2015.	In	the	light	of	market	capitalisation	by	June	2015,	the	NYSE	ranked	No1	largest	stock	exchange	in	the	world,	followed	by	Nasda	(2nd),	TSE	(4th),	LSE	(5th),	HKEx	(7th)	and	SGX	(21st).	Data	from	World	Federation	of	Exchanges,	Monthly	report	as	of	30	June	2015,	at<	http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/monthly-query-tool>	accessed	26	July	2015.	6	Cassis	states	that	stock	exchanges	set	the	pulse	of	financial	centres.	See	Youssef	Cassis,	Capitals	
of	Capital	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	International	Financial	Centres	1780–2009,	(2nd	ed.,	CUP	2006),	6.	The	Top	10	financial	centres	in	the	world,	according	to	the	Global	Financial	Centre	Index,	all	have		stock		exchange		headquarters.		Stock	exchanges		certainly		contribute		to		financial		centres		in		tangible		(employment,		infrastructure)		and		intangible		ways		(image,		brand,		reputation).	See	Dariusz	Wójcik,	‘Revolution	in	the	Stock	Exchange	Industry:		Two-sided	Platforms,	Battle	for	Liquidity,	and	Financial	Centres’	(2010),	2,	at		<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653827>	accessed	26	July	2015.	7	Sanford	Grossman	and	Oliver	Hart,	‘One	Share-One	Vote	and	the	Market	for	Corporate	Control’	(1988)	20	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	175.	Milton	Harris	and	Artur	Raviv,	‘Corporate	Governance:	Voting	Rights	and	Majority	Rules’	(1988)	20	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	203.	Milton	Harris	and	Artur	Raviv,	‘The	Design	of	Securities’	(1989)	24	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	255.	The	three	articles	support	the	optimality	of	the	one	share-one	vote	rule	and	argue	that	multiple	classes	of	shares	are	not	socially	optimal.	8	Frank	n	and	Daniel	Fischel,	The	Economic	Structure	of	Corporate	Law	(Harvard	University	Press	1991),	73	(‘Votes	follow	the	residual	interest	in	the	firm,	and	unless	each	element	of	the	residual	interest	carries	an	equal	voting	right,	there	will	be	a	needless	agency	cost	of	management.’);	and	Colleen	Dunlavy,	‘Social	Conceptions	of	the	Corporation:	Insights	from	the	History	of	Shareholder	Voting	Rights’	(2006)	63	Washington	and	Lee	Law	Review	1347,	1367.	However,	Hayden	and	Bodle	argue	that	the	assumption	of	shareholder	homogeneity	is	false	as	corporate	democracies	tend	to	define	the	requisite	institutional	interest	too	narrowly	and	thus	restrict	the	right	to	vote	to	shareholders	alone.	See	Grant	Hayden	and	Mattew	Bodle,	‘One	Share,	One	Vote	and	the	False	Promise	of	Shareholders	Homogeneity’	(2008)	30	Cardozo	Law	Review	445.	9	Herry	Manne	‘Some	Theoretical	Aspects	of	Share	Voting:	An	Essay	in	Honor	of	Adolf	A.	Berle’	(1964)	64	Columbia	Law	Review	1427;	Frank	Easterbrook	and	Daniel	Fischel,	‘Voting	in	Corporate	Law’	(1983)	26	Journal	of	Law	and	Economics	395.	
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	Despite	 the	 debates,	 DCS	will	 likely	 persist	 and	 succeed	 in	 some	 jurisdictions.	There	 is	 some	 consensus	 that	 without	 the	 availability	 of	 DCS,	 founders	 and	entrepreneurs	would	be	reluctant	to	take	their	companies	public	due	to	the	fear	of	 losing	control.	 In	 the	 long	run,	 it	may	 lead	 to	a	curtailment	 in	 the	growth	of	new	 and	 emerging	 companies.	23	Some	proactivists	 even	 claim	 that	 there	 is	 no	social	need	to	constrain	the	choice	of	share	structure	because	companies	choose	DCS	will	only	do	so	if	the	benefits	outweigh	the	cost.24	But	more	realists	propose	that	 the	 centre	 of	 debate	 should	 be	 shifted	 to	 how	 the	 governance	 of	 DCS	companies	can	be	improved	so	as	to	minimise	the	added	agency	costs	while	still	maintaining	their	inherent	efficiencies	and	benefits.25		
	
III. Divided	Stances	of	Global	Financial	Centres		This	section	examines	the	regulatory	treatment	of	DCS	in	Top	5	global	financial	centres	which	have	developed	markets	for	trading	listed	securities.		


















B. London		The	 concept	 of	 one	 share-one	 vote	 is	 also	 the	 default	 position	 under	 the	 UK	Companies	 Act	 2006,	 but	 subject	 to	 any	 provision	 of	 the	 company’s	 articles.47	The	 Premium	 Listing	 Principles	 set	 out	 in	 Listing	 Rule	 7.2.1AR	 apply	 to	 every	company	with	a	premium	listing	of	their	equity	shares.48	Under	Premium	Listing	Principle	5,	a	 listed	company	must	ensure	 that	 it	 treats	all	holders	of	 the	same	class	of	premium	listed	shares	equally	in	respect	of	the	rights	attaching	to	such	listed	equity	shares	except	where	holders	are	in	a	different	position.		On	 2	 October	 2012,	 the	 Financial	 Conduct	 Authority	 (FCA)	 launched	 a	consultation	 (CP12/25)	 on	 ‘Enhancing	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Listing	Regime’,	largely	 in	 response	 to	 market	 pressure	 to	 improve	 protections	 for	 minority	shareholders	 in	 premium-listed	 issuers	 with	 controlling	 shareholders. 49	Following	on	 from	CP12/25,	 the	paper	 (CP13/15)	was	published	 in	November	2013	to	propose	to	amend	the	way	that	the	listing	principles	are	applied	to	listed	companies.50	One	 year	 later,	 the	 FCA	 published	 the	 final	 rules	 (PS14/8)	regarding	the	two	consultations,	which	came	into	force	on	16	May	2014	subject	to	some	transitional	provisions.51		As	 proposed	 in	 CP13/15,	 two	 additional	 Premium	 Listing	 Principles,	representing	a	‘basic	norm	of	behaviour	for	any	company	wishing	to	raise	capital	in	a	public	market’,	now	apply	to	premium-listed	issuers	as	follows.52		
• Premium	 Listing	 Principle	 3:	 all	 shares	 in	 a	 premium-listed	 share	 class	must	carry	an	equal	number	of	votes	on	any	shareholder	vote;	and																																																									46	Raymond	Siu	Yeung	Chan	and	John	Kong	Shan	Ho,	‘Should	Listed	Companies	be	Allowed	to	Adopt	Dual-Class	Share	Structure	in	Hong	Kong?’	(2014)	43	Common	Law	World	Review	155,	174-179.	47	Section	284	of	the	UK	Companies	Act	2006.	48	See	the	website	of	the	Financial	Conduct	Authority	(FCA),	at	<https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/LR/7/2>	accessed	31	July	2015.	49	For	the	full	text,	at	<https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/consultation-papers/fsa-cp1225>	accessed	3	August	2015.	50	CP13/15	covers	feedback	to	CP12/25,	near-final	rules	based	on	the	original	proposal;	consultation	on	the	revised	or	new	proposals	as	a	result	of	feedback	received,	and	the	associated	draft	rules.	See	FSA,	‘CP13/15:	Feedback	on	CP12/25:	Enhancing	the	effectiveness	of	the	Listing	Regime	and	Further	Consultation’	(2013),	at	<https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/consultation-papers/cp13-15.pdf>	accessed	3	August	2015.	51	FCA,	‘PS14/8:	Response	to	CP13/15	–	Enhancing	the	effectiveness	of	the	Listing	Regime’	(2015),	at<	https://www.fca.org.uk/news/ps14-08-enhancing-the-effectiveness-of-the-listing-regime>	accessed	3	August	2015.	52	Linklaters,	‘Latest	FCA	Proposals:	Enhancing	the	Effectiveness	of	the	Listing	Regime’,	November	2013,	16,	at		<www.linklaters.com/.../A17407415_v0.0_Linklaters_Briefing_FCA_CP13_	15.pdf>	accessed	3	August	2015.	
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shares.70	The	Rule	entitles	the	HKEx	to	approve	the	listing	of	DCS	companies	on	a	case-by-case	 basis	 in	 exceptional	 circumstances,71	however,	 none	 of	 the	 DCS	companies	has	been	admitted	by	the	HKEx	under	such	exception.72		The	Listing	Rule	8.11	has	remained	unaltered	for	more	than	two	decades	since	its	 introduction	for	the	sake	of	market	 integrity.73	However,	 the	HKEx	has	been	recently	 under	 pressure	 to	 change	 Rule	 8.11	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 rejection	 of	Alibaba’s	 listing	 plan	 which	 caused	 the	 loss	 of	 US$300	 million	 in	 anticipated	advisory	 fees	 for	Hong	Kong’s	 financial	 community	and	consequently	 the	harm	on	 its	 trading	 volumes	 and	 prestige.74	In	 order	 to	 attract	 Chinese	 technology	companies,	 the	 108-page	 Concept	 Paper	 was	 published	 by	 the	 HKEx	 on	 29	August	2014	to	seek	public	views	about	DCS.75	The	Concept	Paper	is	intended	to	evaluate	the	debate	on	whether	DCS	companies	should	be	allowed	to	list.	If	there	were	enough	support,	this	would	be	followed	by	a	formal	public	consultation	on	changes	 to	 local	 stock	 market	 regulations.	 The	 Concept	 Paper	 considered	 the	principles	 of	 investor	 protection,	 the	 current	 regulatory	 framework,	 the	competitiveness	of	Hong	Kong	as	one	of	the	world’s	top	listing	venues	as	well	as	other	jurisdictional	practices	on	DCS.			Having	reviewed	all	the	responses	to	the	Concept	Paper,76	the	HKEx	published	its	conclusions	 on	 19	 June	 2015,	 stating	 that	 there	 is	 support	 for	 a	 public	consultation	 on	 proposed	 changes	 to	 its	 listing	 rules	 and	 the	 acceptability	 of	DCS.77	In	 its	 conclusions,	 the	 HKEx	 noted	 that	 a	 majority	 of	 respondents	 had	expressed	support	 for	the	use	of	DCS	 in	some	circumstances,	and	expressed	its	belief	 that	 there	are	measures	 to	put	 in	place	 to	mitigate	 the	potential	 risks	 to	investors	 posed	 by	 DCS.	 The	 draft	 proposal	 included	 a	 range	 of	 measures	designed	to	offer	extra	protection	for	shareholders,	such	as	restricting	the	use	of	DCS	to	companies	of	a	certain	size.			However,	the	draft	proposal	to	change	listing	rules	was	unanimously	opposed	by	the	 Securities	 and	 Futures	 Commission	 (SFC)	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 the	 current																																																									70	HKEx,	‘Concept	Paper’	(2014),	n	3,	para	82.	71	See	the	HKEx	Main	Board	Rule	8.11	(GEM	Rule	11.25)	for	the	exceptional	circumstance.	72	Charltons	Solicitors,	‘Hong	Kong	Stock	Exchange	Publishes	Concept	Paper	on	Weighted	Voting	Rights’,	Newsletter	Issue	259,	29	September	2014,	at		<http://www.charltonslaw.com/hong-kong-law/hong-kong-stock-exchange-publishes-concept-paper-on-weighted-voting-rights>	accessed	24	July	2015.	73	The	Listing	Rule	8.11	was	introduced	in	1989	in	response	to	a	stock	market	turmoil	in	March	1987,	which	was	triggered	by	announcements	of	three	companies	with	intention	to	offer	classes	of	ordinary	shares	with	disproportionate	voting	rights	(described	as	‘B'	shares)	via	a	bonus	issue.	74	Flora	Huang	(2015),	2.	75	HKEx,	‘Concept	Paper’	(2014),	n	3.	76	The	responses	were	received	from	listed	companies,	HKEx	staffs,	professional	bodies,	market	practitioners,	institutional	investors	and	retail	investors.	See	the	HKEx’s	website,	‘Responses	to	the	Concept	Paper’,	at		<https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/responses/cp2014082r.htm>	accessed	27	July	2015.	77	For	the	full	text	of	conclusions,	see	HKEx,	‘Consultation	Conclusions:	To	Concept	Paper	on	Weighted	Voting	Rights’	(2015),	at		<https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/Documents/cp2014082cc.pdf	>	accessed	27	July	2015.	
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proposal	 did	 not	 address	 how	 the	 Exchange’s	 proposed	 conditions	 and	safeguards	 pertaining	 to	 the	 structures	 could	 be	 monitored	 and	 what	 actions	could	be	 taken	by	 regulators	or	public	 shareholders	 if	 they	were	not	 complied	with.78	It	 also	 criticised	 the	 regulators’	 subjective	 judgement	 on	 the	 eligibility	criteria	 for	DCS	 companies	 as	 it	would	 give	 rise	 to	 regulatory	 uncertainty	 and	could	result	 in	inconsistent	and	unfair	decision-marking.	Although	HKEx's	draft	proposals	offered	a	number	of	safeguards	 to	prevent	 the	abuse	of	 its	proposed	DCS,	the	SFC	questioned	the	adequacy	of	those	safeguards	in	its	statement.		Last,	the	 SFC	 concluded	 that	 Hong	 Kong’s	 reputation	 would	 be	 harmed	 if	 DCS	structures	became	commonplace,	and	emphasised	that	its	regulatory	function	is	to	‘uphold	the	core	principles	of	fairness	and	transparency	which	underpin	Hong	Kong’s	reputation	as	an	international	financial	centre’.79.			But	 the	SFC’s	response	was	directed	to	primary	 listings	and	didn’t	mention	the	HKEx’s	proposals	regarding	secondary	listings.	Some	commentators	believe	that	the	silence	on	secondary	listing	of	DCS	could	be	a	good	signal	to	potentially	open	the	door	for	a	DCS	company	which	has	already	listed	in	a	market	with	credible	regulatory	standards	to	list	some	shares	in	Hong	Kong.80	This	could	boost	Hong	Kong’s	equity	markets	by	permitting	secondary	 listings	by	US-listed	companies	with	DCS	 structures	 and	 create	 a	 new	way	 for	 companies	 to	 launch	 an	 IPO	 in	Hong	Kong	even	if	their	corporate	structures	would	not	meet	the	requirements	for	a	primary	listing.	Following	the	SFC’s	release,	HKEx	announced	that	it	would	engage	with	the	SFC	to	find	out	‘the	best	way	forward	in	light	of	the	views	of	the	SFC’	as	any	rule	change	must	require	the	approval	of	the	SFC.81		A	subsequent	question	has	been	raised:	why	the	US	can	embrace	DCS	while	Hong	Kong	 cannot?	 Many	 researchers	 and	 practitioners	 try	 to	 find	 out	 some	attributors	 that	 cultivate	 the	DCS	 companies	 in	 the	US	but	 are	not	 available	 in	other	 countries.	 They	 conclude	 that	 legal	 and	 institutional	 frameworks	particularly	relevant	 to	DCS	 include	a	deeper	professional	 investor	base,	better	protection	of	minority	shareholders’	rights	and	a	litigious	culture.82	Unlike	its	US	counterparts,	 Hong	Kong	 stock	markets	 are	 dominated	 by	 retail	 investors	 and	family	 companies	with	 concentrated	 ownership,	 so	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 authorities	place	a	strong	emphasis	on	preventing	abuses	rather	than	curing	these	abuses.83																																																									78	SFC,	‘SFC	Statement	on	the	SEHK’s	Draft	Proposal	on	Weighted	Voting	Rights’,	25	June	2015,	at	<http://edistributionweb.sfc.hk/t/ViewEmail/j/C5CD004D12EE9F25/F672ACDCDBF32846942A2DF08F503B7C>	accessed	27	July	2015.	79	Ibid.	80	Josh	Noble,	‘Hong	Kong	Regulator	Rejects	Proposals	for	Voting	Change’	(Financial	Times,	25	June	2015),	at	<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/12a62b6e-1b1f-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480.html#axzz3h5fHZQoR>	accessed	27	July	2015.	Also,	see	Ashley	Lee,	‘SFC	Rejects	HKEx	Weighted	Voting	Rights	Conclusions’	(IFLR,	26	June	2015),	at	<	http://www.iflr.com/Article/3465852/SFC-rejects-HKEx-weighted-voting-rights-conclusions.html>	accessed	27	July	2015.	81	HKEx,	‘The	Exchange's	Response	to	the	SFC's	Statement	in	Relation	to	the	Draft	Proposal	on	Weighted	Voting	Rights’,	News	Release,	25	June	2015,	at		<https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/hkexnews/2015/150625news.htm>	accessed	27	July	2015.	82	Chan	and	Ho	(2014),	n	46,	175.	83		A	proportion	of	retail	investors	in	Hong	Kong	is	estimated	to	36	percent.	See	Hong	Kong	Exchanges	and	Clearing	Limited,	Retail	Investors	Survey	2011	(2012),	available	at		
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This	is	also	seen	in	the	litigation	system	that	distinguishes	the	two	jurisdictions.	Hong	Kong	takes	a	more	ex-ante	approach	to	prevent	litigation	from	occurring	in	the	 first	 place	 by	 imposing	 more	 stringent	 IPO	 requirements	 and	 public	disclosure	 while	 the	 US	 takes	 a	 more	 ex-post	 approach	 by	 providing	 various	mechanisms	 to	 investors	and	 lawyers	 to	purse	 lawsuits	 against	 abusers.	84	Due	to	the	different	institutional	conditions,	the	fear	exists	that	the	adoption	of	DCS	would	‘easily	lead	to	a	lessening	of	confidence	in	Hong	Kong	as	a	major	financial	centre’85,	which	is	why	Hong	Kong	opposes	the	indiscriminate	issuance	of	shares.		
D. Singapore		Traditionally,	 Singapore	 held	 firm	 against	 the	 dilution	 of	 the	 principle	 of	proportionality.86	The	Singapore	Stock	Exchange	(SGX)	issued	guidance	in	2011	that	Singapore	did	not	permit	a	listing	of	DCS	on	the	ground	that	they	entrenched	control.87	But	the	listing	of	newspaper	companies	is	an	exception.	The	Singapore	Newspaper	 and	Printing	Presses	Act	mandates	 the	 issue	 of	 separate	 classes	 of	shares	with	 different	 voting	 rights	 by	 Singapore’s	 listed	newspaper	 companies	such	 as	 Singapore	 Press	 Holdings. 88 	Every	 newspaper	 that	 publishes	 in	Singapore	must	create	 two	classes	of	shares:	management	shares	and	ordinary	shares.	 Each	 management	 shareholder	 has	 200	 times	 the	 voting	 rights	 of	 an	ordinary	shareholder	over	any	resolution	relating	to	the	appointment/dismissal	of	 a	 director	 or	 any	 staff	 member	 of	 the	 newspaper	 company.89	Management	shares	 can	 only	 be	 owned	 by	 Singaporean	 citizens	 or	 corporations	 that	 have	been	approved	by	the	government,	also	permissions	to	hold	management	shares	can	be	revoked	by	the	government.90		When	 the	 world’s	 best	 supported	 football	 giant	 Manchester	 United	 gave	 up	Singapore	for	a	New	York	listing	raising	US$233	million	in	2012	mainly	owing	to																																																																																																																																																															<https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/research/Documents/RIS2011.pdf>	accessed	15	December	2015.	In	around	60	percent	of	listed	Hong	Kong	companies,	a	family	controls	at	least	10	percent	of	voting	rights.	See	Richard	Carney	and	Travers	Child,	‘Changes	to	the	Ownership	and	Control	of	East	Asian	Corporations	between	1996	and	2008:	the	Primacy	of	Politics’	(2013)	107	
Journal	of	Financial	Economics	494.	84	King	Fung	Tsang,	‘Listing	Destination	of	Chinese	Companies:	New	York	or	Hong	Kong?’	(2010)	23	Columbia	Journal	of	Asian	Law	357.	85	The	Standing	Committee	on	Company	Law	Reform,	‘The	Third	Interim	Report	of	the	Standing	Committee	on	Company	Law	Reform:	B	Shares’	(July	1987),	para	12.	An	extract	from	that	report	(including	the	relevant	paragraphs)	is	included	in	Appendix	1	of	HKEx,	‘Concept	Paper’	(2014),	n	3.	86	Singapore	Companies	Act,	section	64.		87	SGX,	‘The	Capital	Structure	of	Listed	Companies	in	Singapore	Regulators	Column,	Regulators	Column,	20	September	2011,	at		<http://www.mondovisione.com/news/the-capital-structure-of-listed-companies-in-singapore/>	accessed	6	August	2015.	88	Singapore	Newspaper	and	Printing	Presses	Act	(Cap.206),	section	10.	89	Ibid,	section	10(1).	90	Singapore’s	strict	approach	to	press	regulation	in	particular	public	expressive	conduct	reflects	the	ruling	party’s	belief	that	the	government	has	the	trust	and	respect	of	the	population	fits	[Singapore]	better	than	the	Western.	Singapore	Parliament,	‘White	Paper	on	Share	Values’	(1991),	para.	41;	also	Thio	Li-ann,	‘Between	Apology	and	Apogee,	Autochthony:	The	“Rule	of	Law”	Beyond	the	Rules	of	Law	in	Singapore’	(2012)	Singapore	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	269;	and	Po	Jen	Yap,	Constitutional	Dialogue	in	Common	Law	Asia	(OUP	2015),	118-9	
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the	 denial	 of	 DCS	 by	 the	 SGX.91	It	 raised	 the	 question	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 SGX	missed	attracting	a	global	brand	to	list	because	of	arcane	corporate	governance	practices.	Again,	Alibaba	went	on	to	list	in	NYSE,	achieving	a	spectacular	success	on	its	debut	in	2014,	which	left	some	wondering	how	many	DCS	companies	the	SGX	 could	 afford	 to	 sacrifice	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 its	 one	 share-one	 vote	 principle.92	The	debate	about	allowing	DCS	in	Singapore	was	put	on	agenda	again	in	the	light	of	the	Government’s	process	in	revision	of	the	Companies	Act	to	remove	the	one	share-one	vote	restriction.93		In	 April	 2011,	 the	 amendments	 to	 the	 Companies	 Act	 were	 proposed	 by	 the	Steering	Committee	 for	 the	Review	of	 the	Companies	Act	(Steering	Committee)	which	 was	 established	 in	 2007	 to	 undertake	 a	 comprehensive	 review	 of	 the	Companies	Act.94	The	proposal	suggested	to	allow	companies	to	issue	non-voting	shares	and	shares	carrying	multiple	votes	if	their	Articles	allow	it	and	subject	to	certain	 safeguards.95	In	 doing	 so,	 the	 Steering	 Committee	 explained	 that	 the	rationale	was	that	multiple-vote	shares	and	non-voting	shares	would	allow	such	companies	 greater	 flexibility	 in	 capital	 management.	 One	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	contrary	view	is	that	treating	all	shareholders	equally	in	respect	of	voting	rights	is	fundamental	for	good	corporate	governance	and	minority	shareholder	holders	in	particular	in	the	Asian	context	where	family	companies	are	common.96		The	proposal	by	the	Steering	Committee	was	accepted	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance	(MOF)	 in	 October	 2012.97	The	 MOF	 believes	 that	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	proposal	will	align	Singaporean	law	with	the	main	stream	of	developed	countries	such	 as	 the	 US,	 which	 allow	 DCS.98	In	 connection	 with	 the	 proposal,	 the	 MOF																																																									91	Daniel	Stanton	and	Fiona	Lau,	‘Exclusive:	Manchester	United	drops	Asia	IPO	for	U.S.’	(Reuters,	13	June	2012),	at	<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/13/us-singapore-us-ipo-manchester-united-if-idUSBRE85C0MO20120613>	accessed	4	August	2015.	92	Goh	Eng	Yeow,	‘'Dual-class	Shares’	May	not	be	Apt	for	S’pore	investors’	(Straits	Times,	15	October	2014),	at	<http://business.asiaone.com/news/dual-class-shares-may-not-be-apt-spore-investors>	accessed	4	August	2015;	and		93	Dayne	Ho	and	Stefanie	Yuen	Thio,	‘Time	to	rethink	dual-class	shares	for	public	listed	companies	in	Singapore’	(Business	Times,	1	October	2014),	at		<http://www.tsmplaw.com/news/Time%20to%20rethink%20dual-class%20shares%20for%20public%20listed%20companies%20in%20Singapore.pdf>	accessed	4	August	2015.	94	MOF,	‘Consultation	Paper	on	the	Report	of	the	Steering	Committee	for	Review	of	the	Companies	Act’	(June	 2011),	at		<https://www.acra.gov.sg/uploadedFiles/Content/Publications/Public_Consultation/SCReportComplete28Jul.pdf>	accessed	4	August	2015.	95	Ibid,	16,	‘Recommendation	3.4	-	Companies	should	be	allowed	to	issue	non-voting	shares	and	shares	with	multiple	votes;	Recommendation	3.5	–	Section	64	should	be	deleted’.		96	Drew	&	Napier	LLC,	‘Amendments	to	the	Companies	Act:	(1)	Multiple-vote	Shares	and	Non-voting	Shares;	(2)	Electronic	Register	of	Members’,	27	November	2014,	at	<	http://www.drewnapier.com/Publications-Events/Legal-Updates/Amendments-to-the-Companies-Act-(1)-multiple-vote	>	accessed	5	August	2015.	97	MOF	and	ACRA,	‘Review	of	the	Singapore	Companies	Act	–	Ministry	of	Finance’s	Responses	to	the	Report	of	the	Steering	Committee	for	Review	of	the	Companies	Act’,	(3	October	2012),	paras	70-75,	at		<http://www.mof.gov.sg/portals/0/Public%20Consultation/AnnexA_SC_RCA.pdf>	accessed	4	August	2015.	98	Ibid,	para.71.	
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stipulates	 that	 certain	 safeguards	 are	 to	 be	 introduced.99	In	 May	 and	 October	2013,	MOF	and	the	Accounting	and	Corporate	Regulatory	Authority	(ACRA)	had	sought	two	rounds	of	public	consultation	on	the	draft	Companies	(Amendment)	Bill	2013.100				The	 Companies	 (Amendment)	 Bill	 (No.25/2014)	 was	 passed	 by	 Parliament	 in	October	 2014.101	The	 Amendment	 allows	 public	 companies	 to	 issue	 different	classes	of	shares	with	either	no	voting	rights	or	multiple	voting	rights	with	the	removal	of	the	one-share-one-vote	restriction.102	SGX	and	Monetary	Authority	of	Singapore	 (MAS)	 are	 reviewing	 where	 DCS	 could	 extend	 to	 listed	 companies.	SGX’s	 existing	policy	of	not	 listing	 issuers	with	DCS	 structures	will	 continue	 to	apply	 pending	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 review.103	From	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 2016,	public	 companies	 in	 Singapore	 can	 issue	 ordinary	 shares	with	 different	 voting	rights.104	By	 allowing	 DCS,	 Singapore’s	 attractiveness	 as	 a	 listing	 destination	would	be	enhanced.	




and	mega-sized	listings.106	The	former	appears	to	be	based	on	the	recent	trend	of	technology	 companies	 using	 DCS.	 For	 the	 latter,	 Large	 IPOs	 will	 attract	institutional	 investors	who	 are	 better	 equipped	 to	 evaluate	 company	 business	and	 management.	 It	 has	 also	 been	 proposed	 that	 some	 restrictions	 and	safeguards	 should	 be	 imposed	 on	 DCS,	 including	 the	 suspension	 of	 superior	voting	 in	 certain	 trigger	events	 such	as	 insolvency	or	qualified	accounts,	 and	a	three-year	sunset	provision	for	companies	with	existing	structure.107			
E. Tokyo		Historically	almost	all	listings	on	Japanese	stock	exchanges	had	been	of	common	shares.	 The	 only	 exception	 was	 Inpex	 Corporation,	 a	 privatised	 oil	 company,	issuing	shares	with	veto	rights	(so-called	golden	shares)	owned	by	the	Japanese	government	 in	 November	 2004.108	The	 provisions	 of	 the	 Commercial	 Code	relating	to	joint	stock	companies	were	replaced	by	the	Japanese	Companies	Act	2005,109	which	incorporated	certain	fundamental	changes	with	respect	to	classes	of	shares.	Article	108	of	the	Companies	Act	2005	allows	a	stock	company	to	issue	more	than	one	types	of	share.	A	company	issuing	more	than	two	types	of	shares	under	 its	 articles	 of	 association	 is	 called	 a	 shurui	 kabushiki	 hakkou	 kaishi	(company	issuing	class	shares).		In	response	to	the	Companies	Act	2005,	the	Advisory	Group	on	Improvements	to	the	 Tokyo	 Stock	 Exchange	 (TSE)	 Listing	 System	 published	 its	 ‘Comprehensive	Improvement	Programme	for	Listing	System	2007’	in	April	2007,	discussing	the	requirements	for	listing	of	shares	classified	with	respect	to	voting	rights	and	the																																																									106	Stefanie	Yuen	Thio,	‘Is	Singapore	Ready	for	Dual-Class	Shares?’,	Business	Times,	15	October	2015,	available	at<http://business.asiaone.com/news/singapore-ready-dual-class-shares>	accessed	15	December	2015.	107	Mak	Yuen	Teen,	‘Say	“No”	to	Dual	Class	Shares’,	Business	Times,	27	November	2015,	available	at<http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/opinion/say-no-to-dual-class-shares	>	accessed	15	December	2015.	108	The	term	‘Golden	share’	arose	in	the	1980s	when	the	British	government	retained	golden	shares	in	companies	in	privatized,	and	later	the	concept	emerged	in	Russia	and	other	European	countries.	They	are	typically	held	by	the	government	in	the	process	of	the	privatization	of	a	government	company.	They	empower	the	government	the	decisive	voting	rights,	thus	to	veto	all	other	shares	in	a	shareholder	meeting.	The	‘Golden	share’	concept	was	introduced	to	the	Japanese	Companies	Act	2005	as	‘preferred	shares	with	veto	rights’	under	Article	108.	For	the	more	details	of	the	evolution	of	Golden	share,	available	at:	<http://www.mutantfrog.com/2011/06/13/the-tale-of-inpex-and-the-golden-share>	accessed	14	October	2015.	109	Japanese	Companies	Act	was	enacted	in	2005	and	is	experiencing	its	first	reform	which	resulted	in	‘the	Outline	for	the	Companies	Act	Reform’	in	2012.	Based	on	the	Outline,	the	amendments	to	the	Companies	Act	(including	several	provisions	concerning	corporate	governance)	were	passed	by	the	Diet	on	20	June	2014	and	took	into	effect	in	May	2015.	The	English	version	of	the	full	legal	text	of	Japanese	Companies	Act	2005	is	available	at	<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=338223>	accessed	28	September	2015.	For	the	details	of	the	Outline,	see	Goto	Gen,	‘The	Outline	for	the	Companies	Act	Reform	in	Japan	and	its	Implications’	(2013)	35	Journal	of	Japanese	Law	13.	And	for	the	latest	amendment	to	the	Companies	Act,	see	Masamichi	Sakamoto	and	Yohei	Harima,	‘Companies	Act	Reform	2014:	Can	the	New	Amendment	to	the	Companies	Act	of	Japan	Strengthen	the	Corporate	Governance	System	of	Japanese	Listed	Companies’	(2014)	City	Yuwa	Partners,	available	at	<	http://www.city-yuwa.com/english/publication/shared/PDF/JLG201415_cy_56-59.pdf>	accessed	28	September	2015.			
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circumstances	in	which	such	shares	should	not	be	permitted.110	The	new	listing	rules	 were	 implemented	 in	 July	 2008,	 consolidating	 a	 draft	 outline	 of	 a	 new	listing	 system	 for	 classified	 shares,111	and	 the	 ‘Listing	 System	 Improvement	 FY	2008’.112	The	 new	 listing	 rules	 relax	 regulations	 on	 the	 use	 of	 certain	 kinds	 of	DCS	 in	 IPOs.	 But	 existing-listed	 companies	 are	 still	 prevented	 from	 issuing	 a	diverse	assortment	of	class	shares.			In	 the	new	rules,	 ‘shares	classified	with	respect	 to	voting	rights’	are	defined	as	shares	with	no	voting	rights,	shares	with	voting	rights	exceeding	other	classes	of	shares,	and	shares	with	voting	rights	fewer	than	the	other	classes	of	shares.	The	TSE	will	decide	whether	a	company	is	qualified	to	issue	two	or	more	classes	of	shares	having	different	voting	rights	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	taking	into	account	any	concern	 that	 the	 interests	of	existing	 shareholders	might	be	 impaired.	The	examination	 of	 an	 application	 for	 the	 issuance	 of	 such	 shares	 will	 involve	 a	formal	 examination	 and	 a	 substantial	 examination.	 A	 formal	 examination,	equivalent	 to	 listing	 requirements	 of	 common	 stocks,	 will	 check	 the	 applicant	company’s	conformity	to	the	numerical	criteria	defined	in	the	‘Criteria	for	Stock	Listing	Examination’.113	The	substantive	examination	will	determine	whether	the	scheme	 of	 the	 relevant	 shares	 respects	 the	 interests	 of	 shareholders	 on	 the	individual	application	basis.			Cyberdyne,	known	for	the	HAL	robot	suit,	was	the	first	company	with	DCS	listed	in	TSE	in	March	2014.114		Cyberdyne	is	authorised	to	issue	two	classes	of	shares	–	common	stock	and	class	B	stock.	Shareholders	of	both	classes	of	stock	have	the	same	rights	with	respect	to	dividends	and	distributions	upon	liquidation.	But	a	class	B	shareholder	has	10	times	as	many	voting	rights	as	a	common	shareholder	given	the	same	unit	sizes.	Class	B	shares	were	held	only	by	Yoshiyuki	Sankai,	the	president	and	CEO	of	the	company,	and	two	foundations	for	which	he	serves	as	a	representative	director.		After	the	IPO	of	Cyberdyne,	the	TSE	again	amended	its	listing	rules	on	DCS	in	July	2014	in	the	course	of	the	detailed	examination	of	Cyberdyne’s	listing.115	Two	key	points	addressed	in	the	2014	amendment	are	(1)	necessity	and	appropriateness																																																									110	TSE,	‘Comprehensive	Improvement	Programme	for	Listing	System	2007’,	24	April	2007,	available	at:	<http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/improvements/general/tvdivq0000004iib-att/2007programjokyo-e.pdf>	accessed	28	September	2015.	111	The	contents	of	the	Outline	are	summarised	by	Kazuhiro	Yoshii,	‘A	New	Share-listing	System	in	Japan’,	July	2008,	available	at	<https://www.amt-law.com/en/pdf/bulletins3_pdf/080821_1a.pdf>	accessed	15	October	2015.	112	TSE,	‘Listing	System	Improvement	FY2008’,	27	May	2008,		available	at	<http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/improvements/general/tvdivq0000004iib-att/080527.pdf>	accessed	15	October	2015.	113	An	overview	of	the	IPO	on	the	TSE	is	available	at	the	website	of	Japan	Exchange	Group	(JPX),	at	<http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing-on-tse/new/basic/index.html>	accessed	15	October	2015.	114	Nikkei,	‘Cyberdyne	to	Debut	on	TSE	Mothers	Market	in	March’,	20	February	2014,	available	at<http://asia.nikkei.com/Markets/Tokyo-Market/Cyberdyne-to-debut-on-TSE-Mothers-market-in-March>	accessed	28	September	2015..		115	Koji	Toshima,	‘Cyberdyne’s	Dual-class	IPO’,	9	December	2014,	available	at		<http://www.iflr1000.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Cyberdynes-dual-class-IPO/Index/1662>	accessed	28	September	2015.	
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for	 use	 of	 a	DCS;	 and	 (2)	 a	 sunset	 clause.116	The	 former	 requires	 that	 a	DCS	 is	necessary	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 common	 interests	 of	 shareholders	 to	ensure	 that	 a	 certain	person	 continues	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 the	business,	 and	 the	structure	is	appropriate	to	achieve	such	necessary	purpose.	Under	this	new	rule,	the	TSE	will	examine	the	nature	of	shares	of	class	stock	and	determine	whether	a	DCS	is	necessary	from	the	common	interests	of	shareholders.	The	latter	of	sunset	clause	 prescribes	 that	 the	 weighted	 stock	 converts	 to	 common	 stock	 if	 the	necessity	of	the	DCS	ceases	to	exit.		Despite	 some	 restrictions	 on	 DCS,	 some	worry	 that	 opening	 door	 to	 DCS	may	exaggerate	 agency	 problems	 by	 a	 group	 structure	 in	 listed	 companies,	 where	public	shareholders	may	be	harmed	by	the	activities	of	controlling	shareholders	or	 group-based	 management.117	According	 to	 the	 TSE	 White	 Paper	 in	 2015,	among	 TSE-listed	 companies,	 629	 companies	 (18.4	 percent)	 have	 controlling	shareholders. 118 	Out	 of	 them,	 61.8	 percent	 (11.4%	 overall)	 have	 parent	companies	and	38.2	percent	 (7.0	percent	overall)	have	controlling	shareholder	other	than	a	parent	company.	Insiders	holding	more	voting	rights	relative	to	cash	flow	 rights	 would	 extract	 more	 private	 benefits	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 outside	shareholders,	in	particular	in	the	context	of	Japan	where	a	high	percentage	of	a	cross-shareholding	structure	between	company	and	bank	has	severely	destroyed	transparency	and	information	disclosure	of	capital	market.119			
IV. Conclusion	
	The	weighted	voting	rights	structure	is	always	controversial	and	is	criticised	by	advocates	of	corporate	governance	as	it	is	regarded	as	a	breach	of	the	principle	of	 one	 share-one	 vote.	 However,	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 empirical	 studies	 on	ownership	disproportionality	do	not	entirely	agree	with	the	theory.	Enthusiasts	believe	that	DCS	allow	entrepreneurs	to	bring	their	ideas	to	the	public	market	at	an	early	stage,	and	enable	companies	to	plan	for	the	long	term.		Around	 the	 Top	 5	 global	 financial	 centres,	 most	 of	 them	 welcome	 or	 have	changed	their	rules	to	allow	DCS.	The	permission	of	the	use	of	DCS	upon	an	IPO	by	New	York	which	has	the	largest	stock	exchange	in	the	world	raises	a	difficult																																																									116	TSE	New	Listing	Guidebook,	‘Guidelines	for	Listing	Examination	II	6.(4)’,	available	at<http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing-on-tse/new/guide/tvdivq0000002g9b-att/bv22ga0000001ufs.pdf>	accessed	14	October	2015.	117	Hideki	Kanda,	‘Regulation	of	Controlling	Shareholders	in	Japan’,	a	presentation	on	EU	Asia	Corporate	Governance	Dialogue	Conference	2015,	available	at<http://law.nus.edu.sg/clb/events/EACG_Dialogue_Conference2015/pdfs/hideki_rcsj_slides.pdf>	accessed	15	December	2015;	and	Sergey	Chernenko	et	al,	‘Agency	costs,	Mispricing,	and	Ownership	Structure’	(2010),	NBER	working	paper	No.	15910	(arguing	that	ownership	structures	including	pyramids,	business	groups,	DCS,	are	prone	to	agency	problems.)	118	TSE,	‘TSE-Listed	Companies	White	Paper	on	Corporate	Governance	2015’,	8-9,	available	at<	http://www.jpx.co.jp/equities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jb0-att/2015.pdf>	accessed	15	December	2015.	119	Ronald	Masulis	et	al,	‘Agency	Problems	at	Dual-Class	Companies’	(2009)	64	Journal	of	Finance	1697;	and	Teng-Kee	Tan	and	Xiao	Fang	Fu,	Proceedings	of	the	International	Conference	on	Chinese	
Enterprise	Research	2007	(World	Scientific	2008),	169	(Usually	60-70	percent	of	corporate	stock	is	possessed	by	banks	in	Japan.	Consequently,	not	only	is	the	agency	problem	not	easy	to	be	discovered,	but	a	lot	of	information	cannot	be	disclosed).	
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question	 for	 stock	 exchanges	 and	 financial	 authorities	 in	 other	 countries.	Singapore	 and	 Tokyo	 follow	 in	 its	 footsteps	 to	 reform	 their	 listing	 framework	and	company	law	to	grant	such	voting	arrangement.	On	the	other	hand,	they	in	particular	 Tokyo	 also	 try	 to	 prevent	 the	 misuse	 of	 DCS	 by	 examining	 the	necessity	 and	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 structure.	 By	 contrast,	 London	 and	Hong	Kong	 stand	 firm	 on	 restrictions	 on	 such	 structure	 to	 protect	 investors	 from	exploitation	 despite	 the	 long	 debates	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 attract	 high-profile	technology	companies	to	list	in	the	territory.			Researchers	and	practitioners	have	tried	to	 find	out	why	the	attitudes	 towards	DCS	are	diversified	 in	different	 jurisdictions.	There	must	be	 some	reasons	 that	DCS	are	permitted	and	work	well	so	far	in	the	US,	yet	such	structures	have	been	criticised	 elsewhere	 for	 insufficient	 investor	 protection.	 One	 possible	explanation	 is	 the	discrepancy	 in	 legal	and	 institutional	 frameworks	 that	allow	listed	 companies	 to	 adopt	DCS	 structure	 in	 favour	 of	 selected	 shareholders.	 In	contrast	to	the	US,	the	powerful	position	of	institutional	investors	and	the	break-through	 rule	 in	 the	 UK	 may	 deter	 the	 development	 of	 DCS.	 Similarly,	 a	paternalistic	 approach	 by	 Hong	 Kong	 to	 prevent	 exploitation	 of	 shareholders	beforehand	leads	the	authorities	to	choose	shareholder	fairness	over	profit.		In	a	nutshell,	the	suitability	and	adaptability	of	DCS	is	largely	path	dependent	on	the	pre-existing	institutional	frameworks	of	the	exchange	as	well	as	the	jurisdiction	in	concern.			One	 way	 or	 another,	 DCS	 provides	 plenty	 of	 material	 for	 argument	 between	competition	 and	 shareholder	 protection.	 It	 also	 brings	 challenges	 to	 other	jurisdictions	whether	 to	 relax	 the	ban	on	 such	 shares,	 in	pursuit	of	 its	push	 to	become	an	appealing	venue	for	emerging	technology	companies.		
